Neural Reuse and the Nature of Evolutionary Constraints by Rathkopf, Charles
 Neural Reuse and the Nature of Evolutionary Constraints  
Charles Rathkopf  
 
 
Abstract. In humans, the reuse of neural structure is particularly pronounced at short, task-
relevant timescales. Here, an argument is developed for the claim that facts about neural 
reuse at task-relevant timescales conflict with at least one characterization of neural reuse 
at an evolutionary timescale. It is then argued that, in order to resolve the conflict, we must 
conceptualize evolutionary-scale reuse more abstractly than has been generally recognized. 
The final section of the paper explores the relationship between neural reuse and human 
nature. It is argued that neural reuse is not well-described as a process that constrains our 
present cognitive capacities. Instead, it liberates those capacities from the ancestral tethers 
that might otherwise have constrained them.  
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1 A latent disagreement about neural reuse 
 
One might think that each time an organism acquires a novel behavioral capacity, some 
correspondingly novel structure must have been wired together in its head. Neural reuse is 
the contrasting idea that novel capacities are often made possible by the redeployment of 
existing neural structures in new task domains. Here, I hope to identify a latent 
disagreement in the scientific discussion of neural reuse.  
 
The disagreement has remained latent because it concerns the relationship between two 
background assumptions, which have themselves received little attention. The first 
assumption concerns the multiplicity of timescales at which neural reuse might occur. The 
second concerns the role of representation in theories of neural function. These two topics 
come together in a particularly interesting way in Stanislas Dehaene’s work on reading 
acquisition. After introducing neural reuse more thoroughly, I will give a brief overview 
of Dehaene’s theory, and draw from it a principle about how timescale and representational 
character are related. That principle – which I call the content constraint view – is not the 
only way to conceive of the relationship between timescale and representational character. 
I sketch an alternative view of this relationship, and then work out three consequences of 
accepting that alternative view, each of which serves to refine our understanding of neural 
reuse.  
 
In the final section of the paper, I explore a loftier and more speculative set of ideas about 
the relationship between neural reuse and human nature. It is argued that, if the view of 
neural reuse developed earlier in the paper is right, then neural reuse helps explain how 
human nature managed to acquire its uniquely open-ended character.  
 
2 Reuse: a central theme, and its variations  
 
Here, I use the term “reuse" in a maximally broad sense, intended to capture a common 
theme running through a complex and partially overlapping set of theories. Labels for these 
theories include “neural repurposing" (Parkinson and Wheatley, 2015), “neuronal 
recycling" (Dehaene and Cohen, 2007), “massive redeployment" (Anderson, 2007), 
“cognitive recycling" (Barack, 2017), and “neural exaptation" (Chapman et al., 2017). 
Neural reuse, in the maximally broad sense intended here, is entailed by each theory in this 
list. It can be defined as a commitment to two simple ideas. The first is that local neural 
structures contribute to multiple cognitive or behavioral tasks. The term "local neural 
structure" is meant to be quite inclusive. It covers everything from cytologically-defined 
microscale structures, such as cortical columns, all the way up to functionally defined 
cortical regions identified by means of brain imaging.  
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The second idea is that the cognitive or behavioral tasks to which a structure contributes 
must be conceptually distinct. If the latter function logically entails the former, the two 
functions are not conceptually distinct. A non-scientific example may be helpful here. 
Consider the following two claims. On Monday, my travel mug is used to transport coffee. 
On Tuesday, it is used to transport hot coffee. Because “transporting hot coffee” entails 
“transporting coffee,” this is not a case of reuse in the relevant sense. To make this a case 
of reuse in the relevant sense, I would have to transport something conceptually unrelated, 
like soup.1 Now let’s consider a neuroscientific example. In task condition A, the 
supplementary motor area (SMA) subserves motor command preparation. In task condition 
B, the SMA subserves reaching movement preparation. Because preparation for a reaching 
movement is one kind of motor command preparation, these two functions are not 
conceptually distinct. The conceptual overlap between these two functions blurs the 
distinction between the theory of neural reuse and the comparatively bland claim that 
neural function is subject to variation of some sort or another. In a review paper on the 
SMA that focuses on conceptual difficulties associated with theories of SMA function, 
Naschev et al. put the point thus: “Functional pleomorphism is conceptually problematic 
owing to the difficulty of explaining the process of switching between different neural 
functions” (Naschev et al., 2008). Another function sometimes ascribed to the SMA is the 
regulation of task-switching, which is arguably distinct from movement preparation, and 
would, therefore, support the case for neural reuse in that area.  
 
The dual characterization provided thus far shows what the various theories of neural reuse 
have in common. They differ from one another in many dimensions, two of which are 
relevant here. The first has to do with timescale. What are the timescales at which neural 
reuse occurs? A view that is commonly assumed, if not explicitly defended, is that there 
are exactly two such scales: one phylogenetic and one ontogenetic (Gallese, 2008; 
Anderson and Finlay, 2014). Such an assumption appears to be held, for example, by 
Parkinson and Wheatley (2015), who divide their discussion of the topic into “neural 
repurposing across lifetimes" and “neural repurposing within lifetimes." It is also 
commonly assumed, if not explicitly defended, that the reuse process at the phylogenetic 
scale stands in a relatively harmonious relationship to reuse at the ontogenetic scale. At the 
very least, none of the existing literature explores the possibility that our description of 
neural reuse at one scale will carry implications for the viability of description at another. 
This assumption can be challenged. As I argue below, once we explore the possibility of 
                                                             
1 In this prosaic example, there is no deep truth about which functions are genuinely 
distinct, because the individuation conditions for the functions of a coffee mug are, 
presumably, a matter of convention rather than discovery. 
 4 
additional timescales, the relations between these two default scales begin to look less 
harmonious. 
  
Another dimension of difference between theories of neural reuse concerns the kinds of 
purposes, or functions, that a theory might describe at each scale. Even after we have 
restricted ourselves to a single scale in space and time, the varieties of neural function are 
many. Some functions are characterized in terms of proximate effects on other neural 
structures; others in terms of distal effects on behavior. Functions can also be distinguished 
with respect to the faculty to which they contribute: perception, memory, motor control, 
etc. The distinction I want to draw, which I take to be orthogonal both to the proximal/distal 
distinction, and to the choice of mental faculty, divides what I will call content functions 
from all others. A content function is any function in which the contribution a structure 
makes to the operation of the system of which it is a part involves the representation of an 
element in the task-environment of the organism.  
 
Two components of this definition deserve some unpacking. The first is the concept of a 
neural representation. In most areas of neuroscience, the term “representation" is used 
liberally.2 The concept I mean to invoke here has a more distinctive theoretical role. A 
pattern of activity only counts as a representation, in the sense I have in mind, if (i) it is 
correlated with some environmental parameter of relevance, and (ii) it plays a causal role 
in the cognitive process that enables the organism to achieve some behavioral goal, by 
acting as a signal that informs the activities of downstream neural mechanisms. This 
account of representation is incomplete, but useful. The first condition suffices to rule out 
neural activity that systematically influences behavior without targeting external 
properties. The second condition rules out what have been called idle correlations 
(Rathkopf, 2017), which fail to figure in the representational activities of the organism 
because no mechanism exists that is capable of exploiting the correlation in order to direct 
behavior.  
 
The second component in the definition of content function that deserves unpacking is the 
concept evoked by the phrase “element in the task-environment of the organism.” To be an 
element in the task-environment of the organism is to be the kind of property to which the 
organism must at some point dedicate attention, in order to complete a particular task 
successfully. Consider, for example, the so-called fusiform face area (FFA) in humans. It 
has been described as cortical structure that is dedicated to the detection of faces 
(Kanwisher, 2010). The representations of faces purportedly instantiated by that structure 
must be consulted before one can, for example, appropriately orient one’s gaze toward a 
                                                             
2 To see this, consider how difficult it is to design an experiment that might serve to falsify the claim 
that “x is a representation," where x is any pattern of neural activity you choose. 
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conversational partner. Faces, therefore, will commonly count as elements in the task 
environment of humans, and face-detection will commonly count as a content function.  
 
The class of non-content functions will include both neural functions that do not demand 
representational characterization, along with neural functions that do, but which are only 
indirectly connected with what would ordinarily be countenanced as a task. As Phillip 
Haueis (2018) has recently argued, there are many kinds of representational activity in the 
brain that are only indirectly involved with the accomplishment of intuitively recognizable 
behavioral goals, and which, therefore, have only a tenuous connection to familiar, folk-
psychological modes of description. Moreover, there are many neural activities that play 
roles that are both highly specific and vital to the life of the organism, but which do not 
admit of representational description at all. Pacemaker neurons, for example, dampen the 
dynamics of various neural networks by means of intrinscally modulated bursting activity 
(Ramirez et al., 2004). Purkinje cells in the cerebellum have been described as gain 
modulators, that multiply incoming signals from a wide variety of perceptual sources 
(Luque et al., 2019). Cases like these reminder us that neural reuse need not, as a matter of 
definition, consist exclusively in transitions between content functions.  
 
Thus far, I have introduced a very general notion of neural reuse, and introduced two ways 
to distinguish between the many kinds of neural function that might be involved in any 
given case of neural reuse. First, I distinguished between neural functions instantiated on 
task-relevant time scale and those instantiated on an evolutionary time scale. Second, I 
distinguished between content functions and non-content functions. The core insight in this 
essay is that these two distinctions are linked, both conceptually and empirically. If we 
characterize the function of a local neural structure at the timescale of an individual task, 
we may find good evidence that it realizes a content function. If, however, we try to 
characterize its function on larger timescales, we are likely to find that the evidence for 
content functions disappears. Before I present the argument that shows how timescale and 
representational status are related, it will be helpful to examine a particular theory of neural 
reuse and its application to a particular cognitive phenomenon. For this purpose, I have 
chosen Stanislas Dehaene’s theory of neuronal recycling and its application to literacy. 
Dehaene’s theory is appropriate for the job, not only because of the strength of its influence, 
which is considerable, but also because it illustrates the logic behind a view of the 
relationship between biological evolution and mental content that is implicit in a lot of 
evolutionary psychology, but which, I’ll argue, ought to be resisted.  
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3 The Paradox of Reading  
 
In his book “Reading in the brain," Dehaene presents a theory of reading and reading 
acquisition. The book begins by introducing what Dehaene calls the reading paradox, 
which is most succinctly expressed in the following two sentences: “Nothing in our 
evolution could have prepared us to absorb language through vision. Yet brain imaging 
demonstrates that the brain contains fixed circuitry exquisitely attuned to reading 
(Dehaene, 2009, p.24)." Dehaene’s version of neural reuse, which he calls the neuronal 
recycling hypothesis, is offered as a solution to this paradox. To understand his theory, 
then, we first need to understand this paradox in more detail, and some of the data that 
appear to generate it.  
 
The reading paradox presents us with two claims that are, ostensibly, both true and 
mutually inconsistent. The first is about human evolution. We know from anthropological 
evidence that the earliest human writing systems appeared about 6,000 years ago, in the 
form of Mesopotamian cuneiform (d’Errico and Colagè, 2018). We also know from 
mutation frequency data that 6,000 years is too short a period for substantial neurogenetic 
adaptations to have accumulated. We can be confident, therefore, that the capacity for 
literacy is not the direct product of a genetic mutation that has only recently swept through 
the human gene pool.  
 
The second half of the paradox also deserves a closer look. What does it mean to say that 
“the brain contains fixed circuitry, exquisitely attuned to reading?" The circuitry to which 
Dehaene refers is a small, functionally defined cortical area located in the left ventral 
occipito-temporal junction. That area is now commonly labeled with a functional 
designation that Dehaene himself coined: the visual word form area, or VWFA. Dehaene 
ascribes two properties to this circuitry. He says that it is fixed, and that it is exquisitely 
attuned to reading. Let us first examine what he means by the latter. Dehaene’s claim that 
the VWFA is exquisitely attuned to reading is what he takes to be the upshot of a family 
of interesting results from lesion and imaging data, which, when taken as a whole, suggest 
that, in literate adult subjects, the area is specialized for word recognition.  
 
The following six pieces of evidence are commonly taken to provide support for this 
localizationist conclusion.  
 
1. In normal literate subjects, the region is differentially responsive to written, but 
not spoken words (Dehaene and Cohen, 2007). 
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2. Illiterate adults do not show responsivity to letters in VWFA, and ex-illiterate 
adults (people who first learned to read in adulthood) exhibit less responsivity than 
literates. (Thiebaut et al., 2012).  
3. In blind subjects, the region is differentially responsive to words in presented in 
Braille, but not to tactile control stimuli (Reich et al., 2011).3 
4. Lesions to the area appear to result in pure alexia, a condition in which formerly 
literate subjects cannot understand written words, despite being able to understand 
and produce verbal speech at roughly normal levels of competency (Gaillard et al., 
2006).  
5. fMRI priming effects in this region are invariant to alternative representations of 
the same priming word. For example, the stimulus “RADIO" is an effective prime 
for “radio," whereas “oidar" is not (Dehaene and Cohen, 2007).  
6. The repetition suppression effect disappears in this region for mirror-images of 
words and individual letters. The visual system regards most objects as equivalent 
to their mirror-images. We learn to violate this rule when learning to read, in order 
to distinguish, for example, “b" from “d." That this region responds differently to 
mirror images suggests that region is sensitive to the words as meaningful units, 
rather than as linear strings of wiry objects (Dehaene and Dehaene-Lambertz, 
2016; Dehaene, 2013).  
 
These results provide strong evidence that the brains of literate adults contain an area with 
a response profile dominated by words and letters. If Dehaene’s interpretation of the data 
is correct, then the overriding function of the VWFA is to represent words and letters. Since 
words and letters are elements of common human task environments, Dehaene’s 
hypothesis describes a content function, in the sense defined above.  
 
The apparently localized nature of word recognition is fascinating in its own right, but what 
exactly is its relevance to the paradox of reading? On Dehaene’s view, it is a theoretical 
surprise that word recognition appears to be carried out in such a small and discrete cortical 
area. The sense of surprise is reinforced by the claim that this area is “fixed.” This term 
refers to the fact that the spatial position of the area, despite being functionally rather than 
anatomically identified, is robust across individual subjects and language groups.4 The 
combination of response-specificity and positional robustness characteristic of the VWFA 
is loosely analogous to the kinds of retinotopic maps found in early visual cortex. By 
analogy to areas like these, Dehaene expects that, in general, positionally robust, map-like 
                                                             
3 Although this claim has recently been disputed, in light of new data. See Kim et al. (2017). 
4 Although see Coltheart (2014) for a somewhat deflationary interpretation of the degree of 
positional robustness that is actually licensed by the neuroimaging data. 
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circuits in human cortex will subserve capacities that emerged long ago and that are part 
of our biological, rather than cultural, heritage.  
 
Now that we have a firmer grasp on the meaning of the two claims involved in the paradox 
of reading, we can ask: is it reasonable to characterize them as a paradox? Perhaps not. If 
we streamline the wording a bit, the purported paradox juxtaposes the claim that (i) 
orthographic word identification is a localized brain function, with the claim that (ii) 
orthographic word identification could not have played a role in human evolution. From a 
logical point of view, these claims are not actually inconsistent. If their conjunction appears 
paradoxical, it is only because we have tacitly accepted a background assumption which 
says that localized content functions are necessarily driven by the genetic evolution of the 
species.  
 
Like many assumptions lurking in the scientific background, this one arouses suspicion as 
soon as it is formulated explicitly and offered up for critical inspection. The assumption 
asks us to contrast evolved functions with learned ones. But, as developmental systems 
theorists have emphasized, this contrast is easily abused, because every neural function 
emerges from a process of biological development, and the distinction between 
development and learning is both highly theoretical and highly contested (Oyama, 2000). 
Moreover, even on a thin conception of learning, there are no uncontroversial examples of 
content functions that develop in its absence. In light of the entangled nature of evolution 
and development, any theory that requires us to assign causal responsibility for a trait to 
one process or the other should at least be explicit about how the assignment should be 
carried out. Since in this case, we are dealing with an implicit assumption, no such 
instructions are provided. It is reasonable to suspect, therefore, that the conceptual 
foundations underlying the assumption are unstable. In Section 6, I’ll argue that the 
assumption should be rejected. In the following section, however, we examine Dehaene’s 
favored solution instead.  
 
4 Neuronal Recycling as a Solution to the Paradox  
 
Because Dehaene leaves untouched the assumption linking localization and evolutionary 
provenance, the only way he can solve the paradox of reading is by showing that, contrary 
to first appearance, one of the two claims that comprise the paradox is not strictly true. 
Dehaene aims to undermine, or at least weaken, the claim about evolution. The theory of 
neuronal recycling says that, although natural selection cannot be directly responsible for 
having shaped a circuit dedicated to reading, natural selection is, nevertheless, responsible 
for having indirectly shaped the mechanism that enables us to read. Natural selection 
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shaped a circuit for a particular function that is sufficiently close to reading, but which, 
unlike reading itself, reaches far back into human evolutionary history.  
 
Cultural acquisitions (e.g., reading) must find their “neuronal niche," a set 
of circuits that are sufficiently close to the required function and 
sufficiently plastic as to reorient a significant fraction of their neural 
resources to this novel use (Dehaene and Cohen, 2007).  
 
Here, and in other passages, Dehaene appeals to a principle of similarity between functions 
to explain what makes it the case that they share the same cortical fate. The similarity 
relation holds between an older function and a newer one. At this point, it will be useful to 
introduce a pair of terminological stipulations. In any case of neural reuse, whether it 
occurs on an evolutionary scale or not, I’ll refer to the older function as the primary 
function, and the newer one as the secondary function. A core commitment of neuronal 
recycling can then be expressed as follows: primary functions are necessarily similar to 
secondary functions. When expressed this way, the obscurity of the claim looms large. 
Similarity with respect to what?  
 
In Dehaene’s 2009 book, as well as in many of the articles he has produced with various 
co-authors on the topic, including the 2007 article with Laurent Cohen, (from which the 
quote above is drawn) his answer to this question appears to be that the relevant kind of 
similarity is similarity with respect to content. Dehaene stresses that, according to neuronal 
recycling, cortical circuits are typically biased towards the representation of certain 
elements of the organism’s task environment. These biases serve to constrain the range of 
cultural symbols humans can learn to use.  
 
According to this view, our evolutionary history, and therefore our genetic 
organization, specifies a cerebral architecture that is both constrained and 
partially plastic, and that delimits a space of learnable objects. New 
cultural acquisitions are possible only inasmuch as they are able to fit 
within the pre-existing constraints of our brain architecture (Dehaene, 
2008, p.12).  
 
What kinds of neural properties have the power to delimit the space of learnable objects, 
as Dehaene puts it? One might attempt to answer this question in terms of content-neutral 
limitations on the systems’ capacity to process information. If the object is too complex for 
the perceptual system to discriminate, for example, it is not a learnable object. (This is, 
presumably, one reason that no written languages employ symbols with 1000 overlapping 
components.) However, this is not the kind of answer Dehaene has in mind. Dehaene’s 
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view seems to be that the limitation is neither merely perceptual, nor directly related to the 
complexity of the object. On Dehaene’s view, we have an inherited “preference" for objects 
with particular semantic qualities. These content preferences are genetically entrenched, 
and it is in virtue of that entrenchment that the space of learnable objects is limited. On this 
view, unless some very sophisticated genetic engineering becomes a viable option, the 
space of learnable objects is destined to remain circumscribed.  
 
This focus on evolutionarily entrenched content is one way of making sense of two bodies 
of evidence. The first body of evidence is the response specificity of the VWFA, which 
was described above. The second body of evidence is the fact that all known written 
languages employ characters with specific geometric similarities. For example, if you plot 
the distribution of the number of line crossings required to represent all of the written 
characters in all of the world’s languages, you get a tight cluster around the number three 
(Changizi and Shimojo, 2005). Dehaene also cites as evidence the (purported) fact that 
written characters in all human languages are necessarily composed of combinations of 
elementary shapes. Dehaene sees both bodies of evidence (response specificity and 
orthographic similarity across languages) as effects of a hidden common cause - the content 
bias in VWFA. The content bias is postulated, by means of an inference to the best 
explanation, precisely in order to account for both the neural and the anthropological data.5   
 
To summarize the foregoing remarks, Dehaene’s theory of neuronal recycling is offered as 
a solution to the paradox of reading. It counts as a solution because it purports to show that 
the evolutionary claim that constitutes the first half of the paradox is, despite its initial 
plausibility, wrong. Evolution did indeed “prepare us to absorb language through vision,” 
but it did so indirectly. What I will the content constraint view is a theory about that process 
of indirect preparation. It can be split into two claims.  
 
1. The primary evolutionary function of the VWFA is a content function.  
2. Constraints on the range of secondary functions for which the VWFA can be 
“recycled” derive from the nature of the content targeted by its primary function. 
 
In the following section, I provide reasons to think that the content constraint view is 
incorrect. In his most recent work on the topic, Dehaene et al. (2018) defend a view of the 
VWFA that is in tension with the content constraint view. One might worry, therefore, that 
                                                             
5 The anthropological data Dehaene offers as evidence of neural reuse may be not as straightforward 
as he sometimes makes it sound. Max Coltheart has argued that the uniformity to which Dehaene 
refers is simply not there (Coltheart, 2014). I am sympathetic to Coltheart’s concerns about the 
evidence, but would like to resist Dehaene’s account on different grounds altogether. I will therefore 
just assume the evidence says exactly what Dehaene says it does.  
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I have been constructing a straw man. However, my motivation for articulating the view is 
not to weigh in on debates about the neural substrates of literacy. It is rather to articulate a 
conception of neural reuse in which content plays a central explanatory role, even on an 
evolutionary scale. The content constraint view is worth articulating not because it has 
arduous defenders who happen to be wrong, or because it has a severely detrimental effect 
on the design of new experiments, but because the consequences of rejecting it are 
theoretically interesting. Once we reject it, I’ll argue, we see that theories of neural reuse, 
when pitched at an evolutionary scale, are more enigmatic than has been recognized thus 
far. 
 
5 A Clash Between Timescales  
 
The content constraint view describes a process that bridges two timescales. The primary 
function gets stabilized on an evolutionary timescale. It plays an important role in the 
selection history of the organism, and thereby leaves a trace on the genetic information 
transmitted across generations. That genetic information manifests itself in the form of a 
content bias, which is itself expressed by a particular local structure. The secondary 
function operates on a different timescale altogether. It gets stabilized on a developmental 
scale. The target of the secondary function is determined in part by developmental context 
and cultural input, but is also constrained by the content bias in the circuit that subserves 
it. In what follows, the target of my attention is the nature of this purported constraint, and 
how it might have come about over evolutionary time.  
 
The challenge I want to pose emerges from thinking about the evolutionary implications 
of another kind of neural reuse; one that unfolds more quickly than the kind Dehaene 
describes. This faster process, which I call task-scale neural reuse, is a phenomenon in 
which a local neural structure transition from supporting one behavioral task to supporting 
another by means of a reconfiguration of its network of partnering structures. Such 
reconfiguration unfolds on a timescale relevant to individual cognitive and behavioral 
tasks, on the order of minutes. On this view, each structure supports different functions at 
different times, depending not only on the current perceptual input, but also on set of 
structures with which functional connectivity has been established.  
 
The evidence for this architectural principle is multifaceted. One of the more significant 
sources of evidence comes from meta-analyses of brain imaging studies on humans. For 
example, Anderson et al. (2013) ask how many distinct tasks, drawn from distinct cognitive 
domains, are supported by each region of the brain. To estimate an answer to this question, 
they measure voxel-by-voxel diversity in data generated by a collection of over 2,000 
functional neuroimaging experiments. The analysis shows that even small regions of the 
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brain contribute to multiple tasks both within and between cognitive domains (Anderson 
et al., 2013).  
 
The upshot: local neural structures are not highly selective and typically 
contribute to multiple tasks across domain boundaries. Because the 
domains are highly varied, the observations cannot be explained by the 
similarity of the task domains (Anderson, 2014, p.10).  
 
This passage is particularly appropriate for our exposition of Anderson’s view because it 
is explicit about the absence of an underlying similarity relation that could serve to unify 
or circumscribe the set of tasks that a given structure, could, in principle, be recruited to 
support. If the list of functions associated with each structure ranges across both tasks and 
cognitive domains, then no structure specializes in the representation of a particular 
element in a particular task-environment. In other words, no structure specializes in any 
particular content function. The anti-localizationist implications of task-scale neural reuse 
are well known, and detailed arguments to this effect can be found elsewhere (Bergeron, 
2010; Rathkopf, 2013; McCaffrey, 2015).  
 
There is also reason to believe that the distributed functional architecture implied by task-
scale neural reuse has always been a feature of the human brain. Macaque cortex, for 
example, appears to implement a form of task-scale neural reuse (Iriki and Taoka, 2012), 
and the last ancestor common to macaques and humans lived approximately 25 million 
years ago (Distoll and Tosi, 2007). The idea that task-scale neural reuse is ancient in our 
lineage poses a direct threat to the content constraint view. To see this, we need only ask 
what justification we have for claiming that some neural structure has a primary function 
that can be characterized in terms of content. Typically, the biological justification for 
isolating one primary function from the myriad causal interactions in which a given 
structure may be engaged involves an appeal to natural selection. But if task-scale neural 
reuse is ancient, natural selection will have had little opportunity to tailor a structure for its 
capacity to contribute to any particular content function.   
 
This argument shows that if we want to characterize the contribution of a neural structure 
to the capacities of an organism on an evolutionary scale, we cannot invoke any particular 
content-function. And this claim, in turn, conflicts with the content constraint view. If the 
evolution of local neural structures was not driven by the demands of dealing with 
particular kinds of content, then constraints on the range of secondary functions that those 
structures can come to realize are not accurately described as constraints on content. Of 
course, this argument does not show that the range of secondary functions a neural structure 
can come to support is unconstrained. Nor does it show that the operative constraints, 
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whatever they are, are not bound up with the evolutionary history of the organism. It only 
shows that those constraints should not be described as a content-bias embedded in the 
physiology of local neural structures.  
 
As mentioned above, recent work from Dehaene and colleagues on the constraints involved 
in letter recognition in the VWFA displaces the content constraint view, and is, therefore, 
no longer in tension with the apparent preponderance of task-scale neural reuse. The 
alternative view focuses on facts about connectivity, such as the relationship in the ventral 
stream between lateral position and degree of foveal input, or the question of whether a site 
projects to language areas. Similar facts about the connectivity profile of the VWFA had 
been discussed in earlier work (Dehaene, 2009; Hannagan et al., 2015). However, in that 
earlier work, discussions of connectivity appear alongside claims about content bias in the 
VWFA. Facts about connectivity are framed as an explanation for why the VWFA appears 
where it does. This explanation of VWFA location appears to be offered as a supplement 
to the theory of content bias in the VWFA, rather than as a replacement for it. In the most 
recent work (Dehaene-Lambertz et al., 2018), the notion of content bias is simply left out. 
New longitudinal data allowed Deheane-Lambertz et al. to look back in time at the specific 
voxels in each subject that later came to be the site in which the VWFA emerged.6 It turned 
out that, in pre-literate children, those voxels display far less stimulus preference than had 
previously been believed. In light of this new data, the 2018 paper suggests that the 
connectivity profile of the VWFA not only explains its location in cortex; it also generates 
the expected constraints on orthographic symbol use.  
 
I’ll now consider an objection that will likely have occurred to anyone familiar with 
research on object-selective cortex. Isn’t the FFA a good example of a structure that has 
always been largely dedicated to one kind of content, and which, therefore, could have 
undergone selection for its capacity to represent faces? And if it did undergo selection for 
its capacity to represent faces, shouldn’t we say that the representation of face-like content 
is both the primary function of the area, and the source of at least some of the 
developmental constraints it confronts in modern humans? Two lines of response are 
available. One is that the FFA may simply be an exception. One could argue that task-scale 
neural reuse characterizes the functional architecture of most of the brain, but not the FFA. 
In fact, this suggestion is compatible with what I’ve said so far. The central claim in this 
section has a conditional form: if a structure has long been involved in the implementation 
                                                             
6 If you want to study the site at which the VWFA will appear in the brains of children 
who are currently pre-literate, you have to guess where it will appear in the future. 
Individual variability imposes a relatively low ceiling on the accuracy of such guesses. 
The Dehaene-Lambertz et al. (2018) study is the first to overcome this methodological 
difficulty. 
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of task-scale neural reuse, then it is unlikely that the structure was tailored by natural 
selection for the representation of some particular class of content. If the antecedent of the 
conditional goes unsatisfied in a particular, case, the truth-value of the consequent is 
dialectically irrelevant. However, this response may not be the best one. The fact that the 
FFA might be an exception does nothing to show that an appeal to face-like content is the 
most appropriate way to articulate the nature of the developmental constraints on the 
capacities of the cortical site. In this connection, it is worth noting that, in order for past 
content to serve as causal constraint on the range of secondary functions a neural structure 
can acquire, the physiological properties underlying the content bias must be canalized. 
That is, the structure must end up acquiring those properties even in developmental 
environments that lack content-specific perceptual triggers. Without canalization in this 
sense, primary functions could not delimit the space of representational objects, as Dehaene 
puts it, because eventually, alternative cultural environments would emerge, and invite the 
development of alternative neural phenotypes. Is the FFA canalized in this sense? Until 
recently, this question had been impossible to answer. This changed in 2017, however, 
when Mike Arcaro and colleagues used welder’s masks to raise three monkeys in a faceless 
environment. At 200 days after birth, which was the last time that imaging was done before 
exposing the monkeys to a normal social environment, the site corresponding to the FFA 
in those monkeys had not developed a preference for faces (Arcaro et al. 2017).  This shows 
that, even in the case of the FFA, constraints on the development of cortical structures are 
not best articulated in terms of some pre-theoretially familiar class of representational 
content. 
 
6 Three Consequences of the Clash 
 
Here I will briefly to draw out three conceptual consequences of the clash between 
timescales. The first consequence concerns the paradox of reading. Recall that the paradox 
of reading consisted of two explicit claims, and one implicit assumption. The first claim 
says that writing is too recent an invention for either writing or reading to have played a 
role in human genetic evolution. The second claim says that the word identification is 
localized to a particular cortical structure. The implicit assumption was that localized 
content functions are necessarily driven by the genetic evolution of the species, rather than 
by learning and development. In light of the clash between timescales, we can see that the 
assumption deserves to be rejected. Localization of content always depends on the task 
demands imposed by the developmental environment.  
 
The second consequence of the clash concerns the character of ancient primary functions. 
The upshot of the previous section was that the kind of primary functions required by the 
content constraint view are not evolutionarily plausible. What then is the status of ancient 
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primary functions more generally? This is a difficult question, but I think we can say this 
much: if the goal is to characterize just one function that captures the historical role played 
by a given structure, we will have to generalize over the wide variety of task-scale neural 
functions supported by that structure. According to this suggestion, ancient primary 
functions do exist, but are more abstract than the content-constraint view requires. Once 
we generalize over all possible task-scale functions, there is little reason to think that the 
resulting conception of neural function will be accessible by means of folk-psychological 
reasoning. If such abstract functions can be represented accurately, it will be by means of 
a more rarified and theoretical form of representation, perhaps one that draws on the 
language of computation. Only such an abstract conception of function could bring unity 
to the otherwise heterogeneous list of context-bound functions that a given structure will 
subserve over evolutionary history. Alternatively, one might say that the list of context-
bound functions is not subject to any unifying principle, regardless of the degree of 
abstraction we are willing to adopt. The best one can do is to produce open-ended lists of 
context-bound neural functions. Context-bound functions (whether oriented toward a 
particular task or not) are useful for many scientific purposes (Burnston, 2016), but they 
are too disparate to serve as a foundation for an ancient primary function. According to the 
context-bound list suggestion, nothing in nature satisfies the concept of ancient primary 
function.  
 
Regardless of which view of ancient primary functions one prefers, the meaning of the 
claim that a neural structure has been subject to neural reuse on an evolutionary scale turns 
out to be far less transparent an idea than it had at first seemed. The need for a more abstract 
characterization of neural function threatens the coherence of evolutionary neural reuse, 
because, as discussed in the Section 2, reuse demands a degree of conceptual distinctness 
between functions. If a cortical structure primarily performs an abstract function articulated 
in domain-neutral terms, such as, for example, gain modulation, then any apparently novel 
functional activity will count as an instantiation of the same function in a novel context, 
rather than as the realization of new function per se.  
 
I suspect that the initially intuitive impression given by the idea of evolutionary neural 
reuse depends on the intuitive familiarity of the content functions that are mistakenly 
presumed to serve as the relata in the reuse relation. If reuse is imagined to be a transition 
between two content functions, both of which are accessible to folk-psychological 
reasoning, it will appear as though we already understand what is involved in a transition 
from primary to secondary functions (even if the observational consequences associated 
with the instantiation of either function are vague or indeterminate, and that, as a result, we 
cannot precisely specify the empirical content of transition events). However, once we take 
seriously the idea that ancient neural functions cannot be captured in terms of dedication 
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to, or specialization in, any content-type that would be readily accessible from a folk-
psychological stance, intuitions about the boundaries between neural functions wither 
away. As they wither, so does the intuitive status of evolutionary neural reuse itself.  
 
How far should we take this skeptical reasoning? Should we go as far as to declare that any 
suggestion of evolutionary neural reuse is conceptually bankrupt? Certainly not. Reuse 
applies to the structures that compose the human brain just as it applies to every other 
biological trait. As Darwin put it: “Thus, throughout nature almost every part of each living 
being has probably served, in a slightly modified condition, for diverse purposes, and has 
acted in the living machinery of many ancient and distinct specific forms (Darwin, 1877, 
p.284)." An immediate implication of Darwin’s assertion is that neural reuse, in particular, 
has been common. We can accept that implication without presuming that we already know 
what the relata of the neural reuse relation are. Moreover, as noted in the initial discussion 
of content functions, there are many kinds of non-content functions to which the argument 
developed here does not apply.  
 
The third consequence of the clash is a rather subtle, but also rather useful disambiguation 
of a prediction Michael Anderson makes about the relationship between the evolutionary 
age of a neural function, and the amount of cortical real estate it recruits. The ambiguous 
form of the prediction is this: in both evolutionary and developmental time, newer 
functions will demand more cortical real estate than older functions. It is valuable to figure 
out exactly what this prediction says, because it is one of the central principles that lends 
falsifiable empirical content to the neural reuse framework. If we insist on agnosticism 
about the nature of the relata in the neural reuse relation, while remaining cognizant of the 
diversity of kinds of neural function, the ambiguity in Anderson’s prediction becomes easy 
to see. The prediction can be interpreted in strong and weak forms. The weaker 
interpretation treats the two timescales independently, and can be expressed like this:  
 
Weak prediction. It will typically be the case that, (i) for any given pair 
of functions characterized on a developmental timescale, F1 and F2, if F1 
demands more cortical real estate than F2, then F1 will have developed 
later than F2, and (ii) for any given pair of functions characterized on an 
evolutionary timescale, F1 and F2, if F1 demands more cortical real estate 
than F2, F1 will have evolved later than F2.  
 
The strong interpretation collapses the two timescales together. It can be expressed like 
this:  
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Strong prediction. It will typically be the case that if function F1 demands 
more cortical real estate than F2, it will have appeared after F2 both in 
developmental and evolutionary time.  
 
The crucial feature of the strong interpretation is that it appeals to the same pair of functions 
on both scales. It is a neuroscientific application of the late 19th century biologist Ernst 
Haeckel’s memorable pronouncement that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny."  
 
In light of the clash between timescales, only the weaker of these two claims is justified. 
The primary functions that get stabilized on an evolutionary scale will be content-neutral. 
At the task-relevant scale, many of the functions temporarily instantiated by any given 
structure will indeed involve the representation of a particular kind of content. Typically, 
therefore, the functions recognizable at an evolutionary scale will not be recognizable at a 
task-relevant scale. If so, content-oriented neural functions comprise a domain in which, 
contra Haeckel, ontogeny does not recapitulate phylogeny. The content of cognition is less 
tethered by the capacities of our ancestors than a casual consideration of neural reuse would 
suggest.  
 
7 Constraint and Liberation  
 
Thus far, I have argued against the idea that evolutionary constraints on human brain 
function can be articulated in terms of representational content. One might accept this 
conclusion, but nevertheless insist that evolutionary-scale neural reuse entails that 
cognitive function is constrained in other theoretically interesting ways. After all, there is 
no denying that we have inherited identifiable neural structures from our ancestors, and 
that the capacities of those neural structures make cognition possible. I’ll conclude with a 
brief examination of this proposal.  
 
To explore this idea, it will help to articulate what a “constraint" amounts to, in the domain 
of brain evolution. To say that the ancient functional profile of a neural structure constrains 
its modern homologue is to say that the range of capacities associated with the modern 
structure is narrower than it would have been, had the ancient functional profile been 
different. But different in what way? Many alternative ancient functional profiles would 
surely have led to an alternative set of contemporary capacities, but not necessarily to a 
narrower one. What kind of alternative ancient functional profile must we imagine, in order 
to make plausible the idea that, had that alternative been profile been the actual one, we 
would today enjoy an even broader suite of cognitive capacities? Precisely because task-
scale reuse has been part of our species for a long time, it is hard to know how to answer 
this question. Given the ancient provenance of task-scale neural reuse, neural structures 
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have long been capable of realizing a diverse list of functions. Moreover, it is not at all 
clear that nature has imposed a theoretical upper limit on either the length or the diversity 
of that list. So neural reuse at the evolutionary scale has not clearly constrained us; or at 
least not in any way that we can confidently point to. The structures that compose our 
brains are constrained by their evolutionary history, but only in the non-committal sense in 
which every biological structure is “constrained" by its evolutionary history. Neural reuse 
does not entail some special, additional kind of constraint.  
 
What about the opposite view? Is there any sense in which evolutionary neural reuse has 
helped to undermine constraints on our mental life? Anderson (2014) predicts that the late-
evolving capacities that are distinctive of human cognition require more extensive reuse of 
neural structures than older, less distinctively human capacities. Primary examples include 
the reuse of motor circuits for language (Pulvermüller, 2005) and numerical cognition 
(Penner-Wilger and Anderson, 2013). This suggests that, in comparison with other species, 
humans have an unusually amplified capacity to reuse neural structures for novel cognitive 
ends.  
 
This idea is suggestive. In a poetic mood, one might even be tempted to say that neural 
reuse has been a source of human freedom. This claim carries more philosophical baggage 
than the corresponding claim about constraint, but its intended meaning is not difficult to 
work out. Its meaning is approximately the inverse of the claim about constraint. To say 
that neural reuse has been a source of liberation is to say that our species, in virtue of having 
acquired an unusually amplified capacity for task-scale neural reuse, is capable of realizing 
a broader set of neural functions now than we would have been able to realize, had that 
amplified capacity for task-scale neural reuse never been acquired. The counterfactual 
invoked by this claim is easier to evaluate than the one invoked by the claim about 
constraint, since, in this case, the counterfactual refers to a comparatively close possible 
world in which only one property is absent. Moreover, in order to evaluate this 
counterfactual, one does not need to know exactly what our species would have looked 
like, had task-scale reuse not emerged. It would suffice to show that the cognitive repertoire 
of our species would have been radically smaller without it. Let us assume that, at the level 
of the whole organism, the number of cognitive tasks that a human can accomplish is a 
function of the number of tasks that local neural structures can support. Assume also that 
each task recruits a network of local neural structures. If these two assumptions are correct, 
then the number of cognitive tasks that a human can possibly undertake will be a 
combinatoric function of the number of tasks each local structure can support. When 
viewed that way, task-scale neural reuse has exponentially increased the number of tasks 
we humans can undertake, and in that sense, has indeed been a source of human freedom.  
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